The Virginia Business Litigation Blog
Juries are usually told they can award to a successful plaintiff whatever amount they decide is appropriate, however high that number might be. The judge, however, will scrutinize any award of monetary damages to ensure it is supported by the evidence admitted at trial. Courts have a duty to correct a verdict that plainly appears to be unfair or would result in a miscarriage of justice. When it appears to the court that a verdict is unfair in that it is out of proportion to the actual damages sustained, the court has a duty to correct the injustice. (See Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 48 (1985)). A trial court may set aside a verdict if it shocks the court’s conscience, indicating that the jury was likely motivated by passion or prejudice, or that the jury misconceived or misconstrued the facts or law, or where the verdict is so disproportionate to the injuries suffered as to suggest that it is “not the product of a fair and impartial decision.” (See Edmiston v. Kupsenel, 205 Va. 198, 202 (1964)). Trial courts have the power to order a new trial (Va. Code § 8.01-383), or they may give the plaintiff the option of “remittitur” of the excessive verdict in lieu of a new trial (Va. Code § 8.01- 383.1), permitting him to accept judgment for an amount less than the jury awarded.
When analyzing awards of punitive damages for excessiveness, courts look to a number of factors, including (1) the reasonableness between the damages sustained and the amount of the punitive damages award and the measurement of punishment required; (2) whether the award will amount to a double recovery; (3) the proportionality between the compensatory and punitive damages; and (4) the ability of the defendant to pay. (See Baldwin v. McConnell, 273 Va. 650, 657 (2007)). Punitive damage awards that are grossly excessive can also be unconstitutional in that they violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause requires consideration of factors such as (1) whether the award bears a reasonable relationship to the award of compensatory damages; (2) the relationship between the punitive damages award and the actual or potential damage that might have been caused by the acts; (3) the grievousness or degree of reprehensibility of the acts; (4) the degree of malicious intent; (5) the ratio of the award to civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct; and (6) the wealth of the wrongdoer. (See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 575 (1996)).